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AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America'
Who decides arbitrability-the courts or the arbitrator? The United States
Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in the case of AT&T Technol-
ogies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America.2 The Court in AT&T
reaffirmed its earlier holding from United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.,3 where it held that arbitrability is a matter for judicial de-
termination.
4
The Court in AT&T granted certiorari to consider the issue because of
a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit creating an exception
to the rule of court-determined arbitrability. The Seventh Circuit held that
a court could allow the issue of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator
when the issue was so entangled with the merits that a ruling on arbitrability
would necessarily be a ruling on the merits.' In vacating the Seventh Circuit's
decision, the Supreme Court stated that such an exception was never in-
tended-the courts are always to decide whether the parties' dispute falls
within the arbitration agreement. After this determination, the arbitrator
rules on the merits of the dispute.6 The Supreme Court did not offer any
1. 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986).
2. Id. The union brought suit in federal district court pursuant to § 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978)) which provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
3. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
4. 106 S. Ct. at 1418-20; Accord, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see also, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
5. Communications Workers of Am. v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 751 F.2d
203, 207 (7th Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986). (Western Electric changed
its name to AT&T Technologies, Inc.)
6. 106 S. Ct. at 1420.
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new guidelines to aid courts in the difficult task of differentiating between
ruling on the question of arbitrability and ruling on the merits of the dispute,
but it did reaffirm the principles laid down in the Steelworkers Trilogy7 and
explain those holdings on the issue of arbitrability.
The dispute between AT&T and the Communications Workers arose
when AT&T laid off 79 telephone equipment installers from its Chicago base.
The Union protested that this was in violation of Article 20 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties, which the Union interpreted as
not allowing layoffs in any geographic area unless there was a lack of work
in that area. Since AT&T later transferred workers from other areas to
Chicago to fill these jobs, the Union said the lack-of-work provision had
been violated. AT&T contended that Article 20 only specified the order in
which layoffs would occur. In addition, AT&T asserted that the right to lay
off or transfer workers was a right reserved to them under Article 9 of the
agreement-the management functions clause.'
The Union filed a grievance under Article 8, the arbitration clause, of
the collective bargaining agreement, but AT&T refused to submit the issue
to arbitration on the grounds that the decision was not arbitrable. 9 The Union
filed suit to compel arbitration, and the district court, finding that the Union's
interpretation of Article 20 was at least "arguable," held that it was "for
the arbitrator, not the court to decide whether the union's interpretation has
merit."10
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, announcing an
exception to the general rule that courts are to decide the issue of arbitrability.
The court stated:
A court should compel arbitration of the arbitrability issue where the col-
lective bargaining agreement contains a standard arbitration clause, the par-
ties have not clearly excluded the arbitrability issue from arbitration, and
deciding the issue would entangle the court in interpretation of substantive
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) [hereinafter
Steelworkers Trilogy].
8. 106 S. Ct. at 1417. Article 8 of the agreement between the parties is the
arbitration clause which provides that "differences arising with respect to the inter-
pretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder" will be
referred to a mutually agreeable arbitrator upon written demand of either party.
Article 9 of the agreement is the management functions clause which gives manage-
ment the right to hire and terminate employees. Article 20 prescribes the order in
which employees are to be laid off "when lack of work necessitates." Id. at 1416-
17.
9. Id. at 1417.
10. Id.
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provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and thereby involve con-
sideration of the merits of the dispute."
The Seventh Circuit used as support for its holding the language in United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 12 where the Supreme Court
admonished lower courts to "view with suspicion an attempt [by parties to
litigation] to persuade [the court] to become entangled in the construction
of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back
door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize
the services of an arbitrator."' 3 The Seventh Circuit also cited language from
United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co. ,4 which warned against
becoming involved in the merits "when the judiciary undertakes to determine
the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance pro-
cedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function... [of] the
arbitration tribunal."'" In order to avoid deciding any of the substantive
issues of the dispute, the court held that "[s]ince the Agreement contains a
standard arbitration clause, the parties have not clearly excluded the arbitr-
ability issue from arbitration, and to decide arbitrability would require inter-
pretation of substantive provisions of the Agreement, we decline the invitation
to decide arbitrability." 1 6
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the holding of the Seventh
Circuit, ruling that the threshhold question of whether an agreement creates
a duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular grievance is an issue for judicial
determination.' 7 In arriving at its decision, the Court followed the principles
set out in the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy of cases decided in 1960.18 Stating
that the precepts of these cases had served industrial relations well, the Court
11. Communications Workers of Am. v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203,
206 (7th Cir. 1984).
12. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
13. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d at 205 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S.
at 585).
14. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
15. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d at 206 (quoting American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. at 569). The court also cited previous holdings of the Seventh Circuit. In As-
sociated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir.
1970), the court decided arbitrability, but remarked that it would not be proper to
do so where interpreting a broad exclusionary clause would involve consideration of
the merits. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d at 206 (citing Associated Milk Dealers, Inc.,
422 F.2d at 552). In Local 156, United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers v.
Du Quoin Packing Co., 337 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1964) and Local 703, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Kennicott Bros. Co., 725 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1984), the court refused
to decide the arbitrability issue definitely, despite ordering arbitration "when the
claim itself purported to be based on an integral clause of the contract." Western
Elec. Co., 751 F.2d at 206 (citing Kennicott Bros. Co., 725 F.2d 1088).
16. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d at 207.
17. 106 S. Ct. at 1420.
18. Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 7.
19871
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saw no reason to "question their validity" or "eviscerate their meaning by
creating an exception."' 9
The Court used four principles drawn from the Steelworkers Trilogy in
its analysis. The first principle from Warrior & Gulf states that "arbitration
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."' 2 The second principle,
also from Warrior & Gulf, states that the question of arbitrability, in the
sense of deciding whether or not a collective bargaining agreement creates a
duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular grievance, is undeniably an issue
for judicial determination.2' The third principle, and the troublesome one in
this case, states that while deciding arbitrability the court is not to rule on
the merits of the case. This principle comes from United Steelworkers v.
American Manufacturing Co." where the Court stated: "courts... have no
business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is
equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular lan-
guage in the written instrument which will support the clain."" The last
principle used by the Court was from Warrior & Gulf and states that where
the contract contains an arbitration clause there is a presumption of arbitr-
ability, and "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage." 2' Using these principles, the Court
concluded that courts should not decide whether the issue was "arguable"
or not, because even if it appears to the court to be frivolous, the Union's
claim that the employer has violated the collective bargaining agreement is
to be decided, not by the court asked to order arbitration, but as the parties
have agreed, by the arbitrator."
The Court then held that the Seventh Circuit was in error when it ordered
the parties to arbitrate before a court determination of arbitrability. The
courts must first determine the parties' intent through an interpretation of
their agreement to arbitrate, and then it is the arbitrator's duty to decide the
merits of the dispute.2 Thus, the Court upheld the demarcation between the
court's right to decide arbitrability and the arbitrator's right to decide the
merits.
The Court vacated and remanded for a new determination of whether
the Company should arbitrate, saying it was not that Court's function to
19. 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986).
20. Id. at 1418 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582).
21. Id. at 1418-19.
22. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23. 106 S. Ct. at 1419 (citing American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568).
24. Id. at 1419 (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83).
25. 106 S. Ct. at 1419.
26. Id. at 1420.
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construe collective bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses in the first
instance, and that there was not sufficient evidence of the parties' previous
bargaining history before the court to determine if the present conflict is
arbitrable. 27 The issue to be decided by the lower court on remand was
whether the conflict over the interpretation of Article 20 of the contract is
to be excluded from arbitration under the arbitration clause of the agree-
ment.28
In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan further explained the Court's
holding, stating that the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the rules of contract
construction and did "precisely what was disapproved of in Warrior & Gulf-
it read Article 9 .. . to make arbitrability depend upon the merits of the
parties' dispute.' '29 The judicial inquiry required to determine arbitrability is
much simpler according to Brennan. The question for the courts is strictly
confined to whether the parties agreed to submit disputes over the meaning
of Article 20 to arbitration. Justice Brennan reasoned that since the contract
contained a standard arbitration clause, the answer must be yes, unless there
is explicit language excepting it or AT&T can show forceful evidence from
the bargaining history of the parties that it should be excluded. A determi-
nation of arbitrability does not require the court even to consider which party
is correct.
30
Justice Brennan's directive is perhaps deceptively simple, and a court
faced with deciding arbitrability without considering the merits of a particular
grievance must make a subtle differentiation. The language from the Steel-
workers Trilogy itself can lead one astray, as demonstrated by the Seventh
Circuit's disposition of this case. 31 The reluctance of the Seventh Circuit to
decide the arbitrability issue in AT&T is easily understood, since the decision
does seem to require interpretation of the language of Articles 8, 9, and 20
of the parties' agreement and would seem to be the very situation that the
Court warned against in the Steelworkers Trilogy. 32 When the court in AT&T
decided that there was a chance that the Union had a valid claim and the
dispute over the layoffs should be arbitrated, it was ruling on the same
question that the arbitrator will be asked to rule on in deciding the merits-
does this dispute fall within the arbitration clause of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement? How is a court to decide whether the dispute should
be submitted to arbitration without interpreting the articles of the agreement?
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1421.
30. Id. at 1421-22.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
32. The district court also saw the case as necessitating a ruling on these other
provisions before it could decide whether they were properly excludable or not. Com-
munications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203, 205 (1984).
1987]
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This note will examine the guidelines laid down by the Court in the
Steelworkers Trilogy to help a court make this decision, and also look at the
development of the federal substantive law of collective bargaining agree-
ments. It will also discuss the problems courts have had in following the
principles laid out in these cases and in interpreting the language of these
decisions that culminated in the Seventh Circuit's exception. The Supreme
Court's ruling in AT&T should clarify these previous holdings on the role
of the judiciary in interpreting arbitration agreements and in deciding ar-
bitrability.
In order to understand the Court's directive in AT&T it is necessary to
understand the background to this decision. Before the decisions in the Steel-
worker Trilogy of 1960, the Supreme Court decided Textile Workers v. Lin-
coln Mils 3 and held that Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act empowered the courts to grant specific performance of the promise to
arbitrate. 34 Before this decision there was uncertainty as to whether a col-
lective bargaining agreement was a contract fully enforceable by the courts.35
Enforceability depended on the laws of the several states, and the common
law in most states did not allow for specific performance of a promise to
arbitrate3 Lincoln Mills changed this by allowing the courts to develop a
federal common law covering collective bargaining agreements. 37
The Steelworkers Trilogy of cases decided in 1960 laid down a series of
guidelines clarifying the role of the judiciary in the labor arbitration process.
In two of the cases the Union asked the court to compel the employer to
arbitrate when the employer insisted it had not promised to do so, as in
AT&T.38 In the third case, the court was asked to enforce an arbitration
33. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
34. Id at 451. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEoL PROCESS, 90-125
(1968); Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 751, 755 (1965).
35. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 34, at 96. Atwood, Issues in Federal-State
Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61, 74 (1985).
Judicial hostility to enforcement of arbitration agreements apparently rested on two
concerns; enforcement of arbitration agreements would wrest power from the courts,
and weaker parties would be forced to relinquish their right to a judicial forum.
36. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 34, at 99.
37. Id. at 100. Wellington feels the Court merely issued an ipse dixit. He sees
the decision as an intrusion by the Court into labor-management affairs that is
contrary to the aims of the FAA (allowing the arbitration process to function without
serious judicial review).
38. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) and Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S.
574 (1960). The facts of Warrior & Gulf were very similar to those of AT&T in that
the employer insisted that the provision under dispute was excluded from arbitration
because of its rights under the management functions clause. Warrior & Gulf had
laid off several employees after arranging to contract out the work that had been
done by these employees. The Company insisted this was a right reserved to them
under the management functions clause and refused to arbitrate.
6
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award that the employer insisted was outside the arbitrator's authority.39 The
Court indicated in all these cases that if a collective bargaining agreement
contains a general promise to arbitrate grievances, a court is to order arbi-
tration or enforce an arbitration award without serious inquiry into whether
the parties agreed to submit the particular grievance to an arbitrator. 40 The
Court thus created a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, saying ar-
bitration should not be denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute."1
4 1
Despite this strong presumption in favor or arbitrability, these cases also
emphasize the consensual nature of the collective bargaining agreement. Par-
ties agree to submit disputes to arbitration through a contract, and no one
should be forced to arbitrate a grievance that was not intended to be a part
of the contract or agreement. 42 Disputes over the meaning of the arbitration
clause itself must be decided by a judge unless the parties have clearly stated
contrary intentions. Parties must also clearly exclude any matter they do not
want submitted to an arbitrator, or the presumption favoring arbitration will
be operative. 43 Courts are not to consider the relative merits of the dispute
when considering whether to order arbitration." These are the general guide-
lines from the Steelworkers Trilogy that the courts have struggled to imple-
ment.
Another important step in the development of a federal substantive law
of arbitration came in 1967 in the case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co.45 There, the Supreme Court declared that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) was a product of Congress' admiralty and commerce
powers and opened the way for future preemption of state laws and a major
expansion of the scope and applicability of federal rules governing arbitra-
tion.4 The Court noted, however, that the FAA permits federal courts to
inquire only into "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure
39. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
40. See H. WELLINGTON, supra note 34, at 101.
41. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
42. Id. at 582. "For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit." Id. See generally M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIL ARBITRATioN § 12 at
151 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1984); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAnv.
L. REv. 1482, 1515-16 (1959).
43. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
44. Id. at 585.
45. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
46. Id. at 404-05. See Atwood, supra note 35, at 80-81 (arguing that by
ignoring the Act's procedural origin, the Court opened the way for intrusion into
state substantive law); see also Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Fed-
eralization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1307 (1985).
1987]
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to comply" in proceedings to compel arbitration. 7 This ruling led to the
severing of the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract in any analysis
by a court considering arbitrability."
The arbitration clause itself thus becomes the focus for an analysis of
arbitrability, and the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as a
whole, or the "container" contract, are excluded. This traditional view was
stated by the court in Necchi v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp. :49
The court must decide whether the parties had agreed to submit the particular
disputes to arbitration. Neither the federal policy in favor of arbitration nor
the ostensible broad reach of the arbitration provision in question relieves
the District Court of [the] judicial responsibility of determining the question
of arbitrability, unless the arbitration provision is so unusually broad that
it clearly vests the arbitrators with the power to resolve questions of arbitr-
ability as well as the merits."
The mistake of the district court that decided AT&T was in finding the
arbitration provision broad enough to exclude the role of the court in de-
termining arbitrability.
The parties can include in their agreement a provision that disputes
regarding all the provisions of the contract, including the arbitration agree-
ment, will be submitted to an arbitrator. But, according to the Supreme
Court's analysis in AT&T, the parties must expressly state that the arbitrator
is to have authority to make a binding determination of such matters. Absent
such a provision, the threshhold issue of arbitrability is for the courts to
decide."1 General language contained in a broad arbitration clause will not
be sufficient in itself to bring the arbitration agreement within the clause.
52
The court asked to decide arbitrability will first look to see if the ar-
bitration clause is broad or narrow. 53 Broad arbitration clauses, such as the
one recommended by the American Arbitration Association," combined with
47. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403.
48. Id. at 404. The Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959) first held that the arbitration clause was
severable from the container contract under federal common law, thus insulating the
arbitration clause from attacks on the container contract. Id. at 407.
49. 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
50. Id. at 696.
51. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. See Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
71 IowA L. Rnv. 1137, 1144-47 (1986); Kalevitch, Arbitrability: The Uniform Ar-
bitration Act in Illinois, 4 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 23 (1973).
54. The standard American Arbitration Association arbitration clause states:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or in relation to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
8
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the underlying standard of doubt from Warrior & Gulf, will almost always
lead to a finding of arbitrability. A narrow clause will require closer scrutiny
by the court before compelling arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit formulated the following test in Prudential Lines, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp.:"
Simply stated, a court should compel arbitration, and permit the arbitrator
to decide whether the dispute falls within the clause if the clause is "broad."
In contrast, if the clause is "narrow," arbitration should not be compelled
unless the court determines that the dispute falls within the clause. Specific
words or phrases alone may not be determinative although words of limi-
tation would indicate a narrower clause. The tone of the clause as a whole
must be considered.56
Thus, use of a broad arbitration clause is strong evidence of the parties'
intent to arbitrate.
There is a difference, however, between saying that a court should rule
that a dispute is arbitrable because there is a broad arbitration clause which
evidences the parties' intent to use arbitration, and saying, as the Seventh
Circuit did in AT&T, that because there is a broad clause there is no need
for a determination by the court. The arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement between AT&T and the Communications Workers called
for the arbitration of "any differences arising with respect to the interpre-
tation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereun-
der. . .. -"7 This is a broad clause, and the Seventh Circuit interpreted it as
being broad enough to cover all disputes having to do with the collective
bargaining agreement, or container contract, in which case the court has no
role except to defer to the arbitrator.
Article 8 also expressly states, however, that it does not cover disputes
"excluded from arbitration by other provisions of this contract." 58 So in
determining the scope of the arbitration clause, the court is forced to examine
the other provisions of the container contract, such as article 9 concerning
the right of the employer to manage the company, and article 20 concerning
the procedure to be followed when layoffs occur. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, says this is as far as the analysis should go. It is not necessary to look
at the merits of the dispute and become involved through the backdoor of
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
American Arbitration Ass'n Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Ass'n 2 (1964).
55. 704 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 64.
57. 106 S. Ct. at 1416. See Note, supra note 53, at 1148 (discussing language
used in determining whether a clause is broad or narrow).
58. 106 S. Ct. at 1416.
19871
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interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause. Whether the claim has merit
or not, it should be arbitrable if the court finds that the arbitration clause
is sufficiently broad and there is no specific exclusion elsewhere in the agree-
ment.59
Properly determining what was exluded from the scope of the arbitration
clause is a job for the court, even if it does seem to be deciding the same
question that an arbitrator must decide. The question then becomes one of
semantics. What is arbitrability? Who decides? When?
In its brief submitted as amicus curiae in support of the Communications
Workers, the National Academy of Arbitrators (Academy) urged the Court
to keep in mind the two ways in which the word arbitrability is used. 6°
Arbitrability can be used when referring to the merits of a dispute-was
AT&T limited from laying off workers as the Union contends?-and this is
clearly a decision for the arbitrator. 6 But arbitrability can also be used in
the sense of a dispute being adjudicable in the process of arbitration, and
when used in this sense, arbitrability "must be decided by a court and the
court must do so solely with reference to the provision dealing with arbitra-
tion."62 If there is an arbitration clause calling for arbitration of questions
of interpretation of the agreement and no specific exclusion, then a court
should order arbitration and never involve itself in the "arbitrability" of the
merits. 3 The Academy urged that the decision of the lower court ordering
arbitration be affirmed, but that the faulty reasoning carving out an exception
to court-ordered arbitrability be corrected."
The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning proposed by the Academy
and reaffirmed the traditional role of the court in deciding arbitrability as
well as the role of the arbitrator in deciding the merits. AT&T reiterates the
principles of substantive federal law established in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
First, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed to submit. 5 Second, arbitra-
bility in the sense of whether a grievance is adjudicable is an issue for judicial
59. Id. at 1419.
60. Brief of the National Academy of Arbitrators at 5-6. AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 751 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1984) (No. 84-
1913). This was the first brief ever filed before the Supreme Court by the Academy.
The Academy gave as its reason the potential this case had for disturbing prior
decisions of the Court and for affecting the relationship between the courts and the
arbitration process in future cases. See also Kalevitch, supra note 53, at 30 (pointing
out the ambiguity of the word "agreement" as used in these discussions).
61. Brief of National Academy, supra note 60, at 5.
62. Id. See also Note, supra note 53, at 1138 (calling a dispute over the scope
of an arbitration clause substantive arbitrability).
63. Brief of National Academy, supra note 60, at 5-6.
64. Id. at 6.
65. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
10
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determination." Third, a court must not rule on the merits of a claim while
deciding arbitrability. 67 Finally, where the contract contains an arbitration
clause there is a presumption of arbitrability unless the matter under dispute
is clearly excluded. 68
These principles were well known to the Seventh Circuit, however, and
were used by them in formulating their exception to court decided arbitra-
bility. The problem faced by that court was deciding where to draw the line
between determining the scope of the arbitration clause and ruling on the
merits of the dispute when both issues involved interpreting the same pro-
visions of the agreement. Whether the Court's decision in AT&T will serve
as sufficient guidance to a court asked to determine arbitrability remains to
be seen, but the judiciary should now realize that the Supreme Court does
see a distinction between the two activities, and a careful court should be
able to determine arbitrability without ruling on the merits.
The holdings in the Steelworkers Trilogy were seen as indicating a strong
federal policy favoring the arbitration process as a means of resolving dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of collective bargaining
agreements and as restricting the role of the courts in this area. 69 AT&T can
be seen as indicating that there still is a role for the courts in interpreting
the scope of the arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement that
cannot be abdicated to the arbitrator in the first instance. 70
66. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1960)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 568.
68. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83; accord Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1984).
69. Smith & Jones, supra note 34, at 757.
70. The holding in AT&T reaffirmed not only the right of the courts to decide
arbitrability, but also the right of the arbitrator to decide the merits. This ruling is
in line with other recent Supreme Court decisions that uphold arbitration as a favored
method of dispute resolution. One commentator has called three recent cases involving
arbitration a new Trilogy in that the Court has dramatically expanded the federal
policy favoring arbitration. Hirshman, supra note 46, at 1307.
In the first of these cases, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Court held that a federal district court abused its
discretion by staying a federal action to compel arbitration until completion of a state
court proceeding between the same parties. Id. at 27-28. The Supreme Court held
the stay was inconsistent with "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."
Id. at 24.
The next term the Court decided Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
and ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted any state law that was in
contradiction. Id. at 16. The Court held that Section 2 of the Act making arbitration
agreements irrevocable and enforceable is substantive federal law enacted under Con-
gress' commerce power, and agreements to arbitrate that might be non-arbitrable
under state law are enforceable under the Act. Id. at 11, 17. See Note, supra note
19871
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The role of the court in deciding arbitrability is strengthened by the
decision in AT&T, and the earlier language of the Court from the Steel-
workers Trilogy is clarified and explained so that a lower court asked to rule
on the arbitrability of a claim will better understand its role in the process
and will not be fearful, as the Seventh Circuit was, of usurping the role of
the arbitrator. The task facing a court asked to decide arbitrability will still
be a delicate one, but the guidelines from AT&T should help a court to
better maintain its balance as it walks the tightrope.
SONDRA B. MORGAN
53, at 1141-42; Hirshman, supra note 46, at 1307.
The third case in the Trilogy is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985). The Supreme Court held that arbitrable state claims pendent to federal
securities claims must be arbitrated if requested by either party. Id. at 217. The Court
concluded that the chief goal of Congress was to ensure the effectiveness of contracts
to arbitrate and if there is a conflict with other goals, as in the intertwining cases,
the Arbitration Act should prevail. Id. at 216-18. See also Note, The Doctrine of
Intertwining: A Dead-End After Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 1986 Mo. J.
Disp. REs. 131.
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